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1 Introduction
With increasing mobility of firms, international competitiveness has become a dom-
inating concern in tax reform. Policy makers give priority to creating a favorable tax
environment to attract internationally mobile firms. It is believed that a company’s
average tax rate is the decisive measure when a country wants to become more at-
tractive as a location of foreign direct investment (FDI). A low effective average tax
rate (EATR), compared to other countries, helps to keep mobile firms at home, and
thus reduces outbound FDI. The EATR refers to discrete location choice or the exten-
sive margin of capital formation. The effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), in contrast,
refers to the intensive margin making existing firms grow larger. The EMTR is thus
believed to be relevant for the growth of domestic businesses which refrain from
FDI and, if at all, serve foreign markets via exports. The voluminous study of the
European Commission (2001) on company taxation in Europe has provided detailed
compilations of EMTRs and EATRs in an intra-European and world wide compari-
son.1 The measurement of effective tax rates is summarized by Devereux and Griffith
(2003) and Sorensen (2004).
Much of the international tax literature (see the reviews of Gordon and Hines 2002;
Gresik 2001; Weichenrieder 1995, and Janeba 1997, or the papers by Haufler and
Schjelderup 2000, and Davies 2004, to mention a few contributions) postulates that
multinational investment flows occur until the marginal product of capital is equalized
across countries. Taxes may drive a wedge between gross returns across countries
and thereby lead to an inefficient international allocation of capital. However, it is not
possible to rationalize the role of EATRs in a framework that allows only for marginal
investments but excludes the discrete nature of FDI. The results in Hines (1996) point
to the sensitivity of international investment with respect to average tax measures.
Devereux and Griffith (1998) systematically introduced the concept of the average
effective tax rate to explain discrete investment choices including location decisions
of multinationals (see Devereux et al. 2002, and Devereux 2007, for reviews). Their
analysis is based on a theoretical framework which draws on the basic structure of
Horstman and Markusen (1992) and emphasizes the role of the EATR for location
choice and the EMTR for investment decisions or plant size conditional on loca-
tion choice. Devereux and Griffith (2003) developed the methodology for measuring
EATRs, thereby complementing the King–Fullerton formulas on EMTRs. They also
showed that the EATR can be expressed as a weighted average of the statutory cor-
porate tax rate and the associated EMTR. Subsequent empirical work is based on
these concepts and shows the differential impact of corporate taxes on location and
scale of multinational investment. Buettner and Ruf (2007) show how the corporate
tax affects the scale of multinational investment via the EMTR measure while loca-
tion is sensitive to the statutory tax rate which is a good proxy for the EATR (see
1Tax reform increasingly aims to create an internationally more competitive tax environment and tends
to focus on EATRs. The German Council of Economic Advisors (GCEA 2006), for example, compiles
and internationally compares EATRs to show how its proposal improves Germany’s ranking. The role of
EMTRs for investment of nationally operating firms are relatively neglected. The US has also become
more concerned with the international impact of taxes, see the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform (2006). For Canada, see the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1997).
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also Buettner and Wamser 2006, on the role of other taxes). Devereux and Lockwood
(2006) analyzed how the investment decisions on location and scale (conditional on
location) determine the aggregate capital stock of multinational firms. They empha-
size that MNE capital stocks are much more sensitive to average tax rates rather than
marginal ones.
The recent theoretical literature has studied models of FDI in imperfectly com-
petitive markets to investigate the impact of taxes on discrete location choice (see
Devereux and Hubbard 2003; Fuest 2005, or Bond 2000, for an early discussion).
In emphasizing the role of taxes to influence international investment behavior of
multinational firms, these papers tend to abstract from the impact of taxes on immo-
bile, local firms which are restricted to the intensive margin of business investment.
Razin and Sadka (2007a, 2007b) have developed a model of heterogeneous firms in-
cluding location choice and intensive investment as well. They use the framework to
guide empirical estimation and to simulate the consequences of tax competition and
harmonization. They are not concerned to analytically demonstrate the separate role
of extensive and intensive investment for national capital formation and the cost of
public funds.
This paper draws on new trade theory which emphasizes firm heterogeneity
and explains how firms choose between exports and FDI as alternative means to
serve foreign markets (see Melitz 2003; Grossman et al. 2006; Helpman 2006;
Helpman et al. 2004; Baldwin 2005, and Baldwin and Forslid 2004, among others).
We thus obtain a general equilibrium model with an endogenous decomposition of
a country’s business sector into local and multinational firms. Local firms produce
at home and export to foreign markets while multinational firms relocate produc-
tion to foreign markets. The EMTR affects the scale (plant size) of both local and
multinational investments. The EATR endogenously determines the composition of
the business sector into local and multinational firms. A high EATR leads more firms
to relocate export production to foreign markets which makes them truly multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs). To analyze these issues, the paper formulates an intertem-
poral version of the “Melitz model” with capital while the standard model is static
with labor being the only factor. Another novelty is the probabilistic formulation of
the Melitz model which is much simpler and yet includes the same basic trade-offs.
Heterogeneous success probabilities in foreign market entry replace the productivity
differences in the Melitz model.2 The symmetry of firms with respect to all other
characteristics keeps the model very tractable. Given extra fixed costs of FDI, only
firms with a high success probability of entering foreign markets will prefer FDI over
exports. Firms with a low success probability will not be able to break even on FDI
since FDI must also pay back the fixed cost of establishing foreign subsidiaries. The
choice between FDI and exports reflects a proximity concentration trade-off: FDI
saves transport costs but duplicates production and fixed costs.
2Bernard et al. (2006) emphasize that empirically more productive firms are “more likely” to start export-
ing. High productivity does not deterministically imply export status. Export status is only more frequent,
or more likely, among these firms. This lends some realism to our probabilistic formulation. Grossman and
Helpman (2004) also include success probabilities to clarify the role of managerial incentives, although
again firm heterogeneity is in factor productivity.
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Based on this general equilibrium model with outward FDI, the paper shows how
the EMTR and EATR measures of the corporate tax play together to determine the
net impact on aggregate national investment. Domestic capital formation results from
the net impact on expansion investment of local production units (intensive margin)
and FDI reflecting the relocation decisions of firms (extensive margin). The paper
thus endogenously explains the impact of the corporate tax on the equilibrium num-
ber of MNEs in the economy. It also appropriately defines the extensive and intensive
elasticities of national investment, reflecting the aggregate consequences of the scale
and location decisions of individual firms. The paper then shows how the behavioral
responses on these two margins determine the aggregate capital stock, aggregate tax
revenues raised from different types of firms, and household sector welfare. In par-
ticular, the paper derives a welfare based measure of the cost of public funds of the
corporate income tax and shows how it depends on the extensive and intensive elas-
ticities and the two measures of effective tax rates. Section 2 sets up the basic frame-
work. Section 3 states comparative static results and characterizes the costs of public
funds. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The argument is based on a simple two period model of a small economy with mo-
nopolistic competition and variable outbound FDI.3 In the first period, a fixed labor
endowment is employed to produce a traditional good (numeraire) which can be con-
sumed or invested. The traditional sector employs a Ricardian technology with a unit
labor coefficient and pays a wage rate of one. A fixed number of n industrial firms
each invests capital (standard good) in period one to supply differentiated goods in pe-
riod two. Each firm is endowed with a worldwide patent for a specific brand which is
a close substitute for other varieties. The firm faces demand worldwide and produces
under conditions of monopolistic competition. A key business choice is whether firms
should serve the foreign market via exports from home subject to transport costs. Al-
ternatively, they could save on transport costs by relocating production abroad and
serving the market locally. However, establishing a foreign subsidiary company re-
quires extra administrative and other fixed costs.
Decision making by firms follows a logical sequence. To begin with, firms inherit
a product design from past innovation and a probability that the product will actu-
ally be valued by consumers. To keep things simple, we assume that a new product
designed by domestic firms always appeals to consumers in the home market. Firms
then invest in a production unit and finally supply the market. In contrast, the firm
may or may not be able to penetrate the foreign market. The success probability of
foreign market introduction varies among the fixed number of brands. Firms must
first decide whether they serve foreign markets with exports or FDI. Second, after
they spend the relevant fixed cost to prepare market entry, the success of market in-
troduction becomes known. If entry fails, the fixed cost is wasted. Third, when the
market is successfully developed, they choose capital investment (at home or abroad,
3For simplicity, we consider only outbound FDI by domestic firms and disregard inbound FDI.
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depending on the export FDI choice) which fixes plant size and sales volume. Fourth,
firms distribute profits and consumers allocate income to innovative and traditional
goods. The presentation of the model follows the principle of backward induction
and starts with consumer choice.
2.1 Demand
Domestic households are endowed with fixed labor L in the first period, earning a
wage w = 1 per unit. Households spend labor income on consumption C1 of the
standard good (numeraire) and save the rest. In the second period, savings S yield
total wealth RS including interest r where R = 1 + r . In addition, agents receive
profits πe from ownership of monopolistic firms and get lump-sum transfers z from
the government. They spend C2 on consumption of the traditional good and E on
their purchases of n differentiated goods. Each brand is available at a producer price
pj and is consumed in quantity cj . Spending is constrained by first and second period
budgets
C1 = L−S, C2 +E = RS+πe +z, E =
∫ n
0
(1−ν)pj cj dj = n(1−v)pc.
(2.1)
The last equality reflects the symmetric nature of preferences and costs. We also
include a demand subsidy for differentiated goods at rate v. The subsidy is merely a
technical device that serves to eliminate the markup pricing distortion if needed (see,
e.g., Keuschnigg 1998). Given producer prices pj , the consumer price is reduced to
(1 − v)pj . Eliminating savings yields the intertemporal budget constraint. It will be
convenient to express it in second period units, RC1 + C2 + E = LR + πe + z.
Assuming linearly separable preferences, present and future consumption are per-
fect substitutes. The interest rate r must thus be equal to the subjective discount rate.
Consumers do not care when to consume but care only about total consumption. Life-
time utility in second period units is U = RC1 + C2 +
∫ n
0 u(cj )dj , or
U = LR + πe + z +
∫ n
0
[
u(cj ) − (1 − ν)pj cj
]
dj. (2.2)
The square bracket gives consumer surplus from consumption of innovative goods.
Demand follows from utility maximization which results in (1 − ν)pj = u′(cj ).4
Specializing to u(cj ) = A1−α · (cj )α/α, 0 < α < 1, and denoting the price elasticity
by ε = 1/(1 − α) > 1, domestic demand for brand j is
cj = A/
(
(1 − ν)pj
)ε
, c
f
j = Af /
(
p
f
j
)ε
. (2.3)
Foreign demand is marked by an upper index f and stems from similar preferences.
In the foreign economy, households consume traditional and innovative goods while
producers are specialized in the numeraire good only. However, the foreign economy
also hosts incoming FDI to manufacture differentiated goods locally. The Appendix
establishes general equilibrium of the world economy.
4Following Krugman (1980), we have assumed additively separable preferences for differentiated goods.
For this reason, the demand function does not include a price index.
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2.2 Home market production
Firms always produce for the home market, but serve the foreign market only when
market access is successful. To supply the home market, firm j invests kj units of
the standard good in the first period. Anticipating symmetry, we suppress the variety
index j . Since capital does not depreciate, investment yields k units of the standard
good in the second period. At the same time, capital is used to produce k units of
a differentiated good. The monopolistic firm supplies the entire domestic market,
c = k, and earns revenues pk.5 The government levies a corporate profit tax at rate t ,
but allows deduction of ek from the tax base. When e = 1, firms can fully deduct
investment, making the corporate tax a cash-flow tax. If e < 1, the tax discriminates
against investment. The discounted present value of the firm’s production for the
home market is [(1 − t)pk + (1 − et)k]/R − (1 − et)k. Measured in units of the
second period, firm value is
π = (1 − t)pk − (1 − et)rk. (2.4)
In period two, tax revenue amounts to πT = t (pk + ek) − tekR = t (p − er)k.
In solving for optimal investment, the firm takes account of its monopoly position
c = k in the market for her brand. Using (2.3), the revenue function is seen to be
concave in capital,6 p(k)k = kα · A1−α/(1 − ν). Alternatively, using k = A/[(1 −
ν)p]ε , the firm’s revenue from domestic sales amounts to
p · k = A · (1 − ν)−ε · p1−ε. (2.5)
Slightly rewriting (2.4), the monopolistically competitive firm’s investment follows
from
π = max
k
(1 − t)(pk − uk), u ≡ 1 − et
1 − t · r, (2.6)
where u stands for the user cost of capital. Taking account of the fact that any in-
creased output from additional investment reduces the producer price p, the optimal-
ity condition becomes p −u+ k · dp/dk = 0. Using the price elasticity given in (2.3)
yields
α · p(k) = u, k = A · (α/[(1 − ν)u])ε. (2.7)
The firm invests until marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. Consequently,
the price of the variety is a fixed markup 1/α over the user cost of capital. The demand
curve determines the level of sales at this price which, in turn, yields output and
capital invested. A closed form solution for profits is found when using αp = u to
5In the absence of taxes, the present value of a firm with investment k is (pk + k)/R − k which amounts
to π = pk − rk if expressed in second period values. Mark-up pricing over marginal cost, p > r , yields
strictly positive profits indicating an excess return on capital over its user cost r .
6For this reason, we can keep technology linear. A concave net output function f (k) would only compli-
cate the analysis without additional insights.
466 C. Keuschnigg
substitute out u in (2.6) which yields π = (1 − t)(1 −α)pk. Replace pk by (2.5) and
again use the markup p = u/α to arrive at
π = (1 − t)B/uε−1, B ≡ (1 − α)Aαε−1/(1 − ν)ε. (2.8)
2.3 Foreign market entry
A domestic firm with a given product design can sell its brand worldwide. Suppose
that the firm has decided to serve the foreign market with exports and that foreign
market entry was successful. Exports involve real trade costs θ − 1 of shipping goods
across border. To cover transport cost, the foreign demand price must exceed the
domestic producer price by a factor θ . For the same reason, an export firm must
produce more than what arrives at foreign consumers, kX > cX . The difference is
lost on transport. Given symmetry in export demand, we again suppress the variety
index and write cX = cfj etc. Foreign demand prices and domestic producer prices
for exports are thus related by
pX = θp, kX = θcX, pX · cX = p · kX, θ ≥ 1. (2.9)
When the monopolistic firm successfully picks up export business, it must invest
an amount kX of the standard good to build the export plant and thereby obtains a
value πX in addition to the value π of its plant that produces for the home market,
πX = (1 − t)pkX − (1 − et)rkX = (1 − t)(p − u)kX. (2.10)
The exporting firm pays tax in the second period equal to πTX = t (p − er)kX .
Since pX = θp, export demand is cX = Af /(θp)ε , giving revenues pkX =
Af /(θp)ε−1. By the same steps as before, exporters choose a markup over user cost
of capital, p = u/α. Profits from export business thus amount to πX = (1 − t)(1 −
α)pkX or
πX = (1 − t)BX/uε−1, BX ≡ (1 − α)Af (α/θ)ε−1. (2.11)
Instead of exporting to the foreign market, the firm could have chosen FDI by
establishing a foreign subsidiary. Since the corporate tax is a source tax, profits of
the foreign subsidiary are subject to the foreign corporate tax which might result in
double taxation of profits upon repatriation. The most commonly adopted rule in the
taxation of MNEs is the exemption principle whereby profits of foreign subsidiaries
are exempt from corporate tax in the parent country. Since the analysis in this pa-
per keeps foreign taxes constant and is exclusively concerned with the intensive and
extensive investment response to the domestic corporate tax, it is useful to entirely
suppress foreign taxes. With a zero foreign tax rate and exemption at home, the user
cost of capital invested abroad is equal to the foreign interest rate, uf = r , which is,
by assumption, equal to domestic interest.7
7If the home country applies the deduction or credit method in taxing foreign source profits, some double
taxation might result. In such cases, the domestic tax rate also determines the cost of foreign invested
capital and thereby changes, to some extent, the tax impact on the exports FDI choice.
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Having opted for FDI to serve the foreign market, the firm saves on transport costs.
Compared to an export firm, it can charge a lower price pI to foreign customers which
boosts sales. The value of the foreign subsidiary to the domestic parent company is
πI = (pI − r)kI . (2.12)
The export versus FDI decision explained below will be well behaved only if πI >
πX . Local production abroad saves transport cost which allows a lower demand price,
and thus boosts sales and profits, making FDI relatively more profitable compared to
exporting.8
2.4 Exports versus FDI
The key element of the model refers to the choice of domestic firms to serve foreign
markets via two rivaling modes: exports or FDI.9 The decision defines the extensive
margin of investment by relocating production and investing abroad if exporting be-
comes less attractive than foreign subsidiary production. The simplest approach is to
assume that foreign market entry is risky and firms succeed only with probability q .
All firms attempt foreign market entry, but some will not be successful so that there
is a margin of purely local firms that earn π only. If market entry fails, the fixed
cost spent on preparing market access is lost. Total profit of successful firms from
global sales amount to π +πX for exporters and π +πI for a multinational company
with foreign subsidiaries. Ex ante, when foreign market entry is still uncertain, the
expected value of global sales is
π¯X = π + q · πX, π¯I = π + q · πI . (2.13)
Preparing foreign market entry requires some fixed costs such as building a dis-
tribution network, fulfilling foreign regulations etc. They are normalized to zero for
exports, fX = 0, making exports the default mode.10 Opting for FDI by establishing
a foreign subsidiary is more expensive. Suppose there are differential fixed costs fI
relating to FDI. Ex ante, before the success of market entry is known, the expected
present value of a foreign subsidiary, net of these fixed costs, would be q ·πI /R−fI .
In terms of second period values, it amounts to q · πI − F where F ≡ RfI .
8By similar steps as before, foreign subsidiaries set a markup of producer price over foreign user cost as
in (2.7), αpI = r . The profit thus is πI = (1 − α)pI kI = (1 − α)Af (α/r)ε−1. Comparing closed form
profits, the inequality is equivalent to 1/rε−1 > (1− t)/(θu)ε−1. It is satisfied in the absence of tax where
u = r . If real trade costs are positive, θ > 1, the condition reduces to 1 > 1/θε−1 and is necessarily fulfilled
since ε > 1 as well. If taxes are not too large, the inequality also holds with positive taxes.
9To endogenize this margin, we choose a much simplified “Melitz model” of monopolistic competition
(see Melitz 2003). Instead of considering firm heterogeneity in labor productivity, giving rise to a distrib-
ution of unit costs, prices, demand, and firm size, we assume identical productivity across firms and keep
the production and demand side symmetric. The only heterogeneity is the risk of foreign market entry. Our
assumptions much increase analytical tractability which has plagued the applications of the Melitz model.
One disadvantage is that we cannot capture how trade and fiscal policy change aggregate productivity by
affecting firm composition. However, this aspect is not the focus of the paper.
10If fX were positive, some firms would not attempt foreign market entry at all and choose to stay local
from the beginning.
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Fig. 1 Exports versus FDI
As a result of past innovation, new product designs are endowed with variable
probabilities q . The extra fixed cost F necessary for FDI is lost without any gain if
market entry fails. FDI is thus worthwhile only for products with a sufficiently high
probability of foreign market access. The critical, indifferent firm is defined by
q∗ · (πI − πX) = F, F ≡ fIR. (2.14)
Figure 1 illustrates the choice between exports and FDI. Since exports involve
transport costs, variable profits are larger when producing locally, πI > πX . FDI,
however, creates higher fixed costs. If a firm will be successful in introducing her
brand in the foreign market with a low probability q only, the differential profit
πI − πX from FDI will materialize only rarely while the fixed cost of establishing
the subsidiary is necessary in any case. Choosing FDI instead of exports is thus not
profitable for firms which stand a low chance of successful foreign market access.
An innovation results in a new specialized brand with uncertain market prospects.
Some brands are more appealing to consumers than others. We assume that each
brand is drawn from a pool of possible innovations where the success probabil-
ity q is represented with density g(q), yielding a cumulative distribution G(q) =∫ q
0 g(q
′)dq ′. Given (a fixed number of) n independent innovations, the mass of firms
with success probability q is g(q)n. According to Fig. 1 and (2.14), all firms with
success probabilities smaller than the critical one, q < q∗, choose exports, the rest
opts for FDI. In the aggregate, of all n domestic firms, a share sF invests the neces-
sary fixed cost F and attempts FDI. The remaining share 1 − sF opts for the export
strategy.
Since foreign market entry is risky and fails with probability q , the fraction of
successful market entrants is much smaller, i.e., sI < sF , sX < 1 − sF and thereby
sI + sX < 1. The remaining part 1 − sI − sX is not successful in penetrating for-
eign markets, stays national and serves only the local market. Therefore, the range of
goods available abroad is smaller than the menu of varieties offered at home:
sX =
∫ q∗
0
q dG(q), sI =
∫ 1
q∗
q dG(q), sF =
∫ 1
q∗
dG(q). (2.15)
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Each firm earns strictly positive rents in the second period. Domestic households
collect profits with a total value of πe . From now on, we normalize the mass of firms
to unity, n = 1, so that sX denotes the mass as well as the share of exporters:
πe = π + sX ·πX +VI , VI =
∫ 1
q∗
(q ·πI −F)dG(q) = sI ·πI − sF ·F. (2.16)
The aggregate value of repatriated profits from foreign subsidiaries, net of fixed costs
spent abroad, is VI . Repatriated profits are part of the economy’s net foreign factor
income.
2.5 General equilibrium
The government is assumed to refund tax revenue in the second period net of the
demand subsidy as lump-sum transfers to households. Since corporate tax revenue
stems only from firms producing at home, the public sector budget is
z = t · (p − er)K − νpc, K ≡ k + sXkX. (2.17)
The aggregate domestic capital stock reflects investments in all plants that serve
the domestic market and those that produce for exports. Outbound FDI of domestic
MNEs equal to sI kI adds to the foreign country’s capital stock. Intensive investment
relates to the size of plants located at home, k and kX . Extensive investment reflects
relocation of production to the foreign country as a result of the export FDI choice
illustrated in Fig. 1, and is felt in a smaller or larger number sX of export plants
located at home rather than abroad. The Appendix in Keuschnigg (2006) derives the
aggregate savings investment identity and the world output market equilibrium.
3 Impact and cost of corporate taxation
The purpose of the paper is twofold. We first show how the measures of effective
marginal and average tax rates, EMTRs, and EATRs, interact to determine the net
impact on national investment. We will find an important interaction. The EMTR not
only affects intensive but also extensive investment by its impact on plant size. Next,
the paper shows how the excess burden of the corporate tax is measured, using the
effective tax rates and appropriately defined behavioral elasticities.
3.1 Effective average and marginal tax rates
The EMTR measures the tax burden on marginal investment. The tax drives a wedge
between the pretax return or cost of capital u, equal to marginal revenue αp, and the
after tax return r . In pushing up the pretax return, it makes the last units of investment
unprofitable and impairs business growth. Using (2.6), the EMTR, denoted by tm, is
tm ≡ u − r
u
= (1 − e)t
1 − et , 1 − tm =
1 − t
1 − et . (3.1)
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The EMTR relates gross and net returns by r = (1 − tm)u and summarizes all rele-
vant parameters of the tax code in a single measure of the distortion on the intensive
margin. It is well known that immediate expensing (e = 1) transforms the corporate
tax into a cash-flow tax, and consequently results in a zero EMTR. When there is no
expensing at all, e = 0, the EMTR coincides with the statutory tax rate, tm = t .
The EATR measures total taxes paid as a share of gross income. In an intertem-
poral model, the relevant concept is the ratio of the present value of tax liability over
the gross, social present value of the firm. Using (2.4), the relevant values in second
period units are π∗ ≡ π + πT = (p − r)k and πT = t (p − er)k. The EATR is thus
defined as
ta ≡ π
T
π∗
= p − er
p − r · t, 1 − ta =
π
π∗
= (1 − t)p − u
p − r . (3.2)
With π∗ being the gross value of the firm, net profits and tax payments are π =
(1 − ta)π∗ and πT = taπ∗ where π∗ = π + πT.
To derive comparative static effects of tax reform, we compute changes of vari-
ables relative to their values in the initial equilibrium. The hat notation indicates
relative changes such as uˆ ≡ du/u. The exceptions are changes in tax rates which are
expressed relative to net of tax prices, e.g., tˆm ≡ dtm/(1 − tm). Since (1 − tm)u = r
and the markup is constant, user cost, and producer price change in proportion to the
EMTR,
pˆ = uˆ = tˆm. (3.3)
How are the effective rates changed by an increase in the statutory rate? The EATR
is an endogenous tax measure that must be determined jointly with the impact of taxes
on equilibrium. Its relative change is found by log-linearizing the equation for 1 − ta
in (3.2), yielding −tˆa = −tˆ + dp−dup−u − dpp−r . Appropriately expanding and noting (3.3)
gives
tˆa = tˆ + r
p − r · tˆm, tˆm =
1 − e
1 − et · tˆ . (3.4)
A first insight is that the statutory rate changes the EATR, as defined in (3.2), both
directly as well as indirectly via its impact on the EMTR which pushes up the user
cost and, via markup pricing, the variety prices. Quite intuitively, a cash-flow tax
with immediate expensing is neutral on the intensive margin. In this case, the EATR
is identical to the statutory rate, tˆm = 0 and tˆa = tˆ .
3.2 Investment and profits
The EMTR pushes up the user cost of capital and leads firms to charge higher prices.
To sustain higher prices, the monopolist must cut back sales and invests less. By the
demand curve in (2.3),
kˆ = −ε · pˆ = −ε · tˆm. (3.5)
The firm’s net of tax profit depends both on the average and marginal tax rates.
To see this, note that gross profit is π∗ = (p − r)k, leaving a net of tax profit π =
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(1 − ta)π∗. Gross profit in log-linearized form is πˆ∗ = pp−r · pˆ + kˆ. Substitute the
preceding results,
πˆ = πˆ∗ − tˆa = −
(
ε − p
p − r
)
· tˆm − tˆa = −p − er
p − u · tˆ , πˆX = πˆ . (3.6)
To obtain the third equality, use ε = 1/(1 −α) and eliminate α by the condition (2.7)
to get ε = p/(p−u). Insert this and tˆa from (3.4) into the round bracket which yields
πˆ = − u
p−u tˆm − tˆ . Substitute now for tˆm and use u from (2.6) to obtain, after some
rearrangements, the result. The third equality states the net effect which is induced
by the statutory rate. It is also directly obtained by applying the envelope theorem
to (2.4), dπ/dt = −(p − er)k, and dividing this by π = (1 − t)(p −u)k. A cash-flow
tax implies e = 1 and u = r , yielding tm = 0 and ta = t . It is not distorting intensive
investment. An increase in the statutory rate would thus leave gross profit unaffected,
πˆ∗ = 0, and reduce net of tax profit by πˆ = −tˆa = −tˆ .
Other things being constant, an increase in the statutory tax rate reduces exporting
profits in exactly the same way. Although the level of demand is different, the relative
change in net profits is the same because the demand elasticity is identical in home
and foreign markets. Assuming that the home country applies the exemption method
to avoid double taxation, profits of foreign subsidiaries net of foreign corporate tax are
exempted at home. Hence, profits πI from FDI are unaffected by domestic taxation,
see (2.12). Investment of foreign subsidiaries depends only on foreign user cost that
is possibly inflated by foreign taxes, but does not change with home taxes.
The FDI export trade-off is illustrated in Fig. 1 and formally resolved by fixing the
cut-off value q∗ in (2.14). Log-differentiating yields qˆ∗ = πˆX · πX/(πI − πX) since
profits πI of foreign subsidiaries are exogenous from the home economy’s perspec-
tive. Inserting the change in export profits from above yields
qˆ∗ = πX
πI − πX · πˆX, πˆX = −
p − er
p − u · tˆ . (3.7)
Domestic corporate taxation raises outbound FDI for two reasons. First, it raises
the EATR and thereby reduces the net of tax profit from exporting, making it more
attractive to serve foreign markets via FDI. Second, it also raises the EMTR, thereby
impairing investment and company growth and reducing profits from domestic export
production. The net effect is given in (3.6) and makes exports less profitable relative
to the FDI alternative. In reducing the cut-off value that identifies the critical firm, the
tax shrinks the number of domestically producing exporters. As more firms decide to
serve foreign demand locally by relocating production abroad, the decomposition
of firms into exporters and multinationals changes in favor of MNEs. Applying the
Leibnitz rule of differentiating integrals to (2.15) yields dsX/dq∗ = q∗g(q∗), and
similarly for the other shares. Expressing in relative changes gives
sˆX = μX · qˆ∗, sˆI = −μI · qˆ∗, sˆF = −μF · qˆ∗, (3.8)
where the coefficients μX ≡ (q∗)2g(q∗)/sX , μI ≡ (q∗)2g(q∗)/sI and μF ≡
q∗g(q∗)/sF are defined as positive values.
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Aggregate national investment reflects intensive (via k and kX) and extensive in-
vestment (via sX). Noting kˆ = kˆX , linearization of national investment in (2.17) yields
Kˆ = kˆ + sXkX
K
· sˆX = kˆ + η · πˆX, η ≡ sXkX
K
μXπX
πI − πX . (3.9)
A higher corporate tax rate inflates the user cost of capital, suppresses business
growth and distorts intensive investment. A higher tax rate also reduces profits from
exporting relative to FDI and thereby distorts extensive investment. When exports
become less profitable relative to FDI, more firms decide to relocate production and
investment by establishing a subsidiary company close to foreign customers.
Profits of exporters and MNEs are different since only exporters are subject to
transport costs and must therefore charge higher prices. Consequently, sales and prof-
its are smaller. The corporate tax might thus affect aggregate profits πe not only by di-
minishing the value of export profits but also by affecting firm composition. By (3.8),
the effect of the cut-off probability on firm shares satisfies dsX = −dsI = −q∗ dsF .
Hence, expected profits in (2.16) change by πeπˆe = ππˆ + sXπXπˆX + [q∗ · (πI −
πX) − F ]dsF . The last bracket is zero due to the endogenous export FDI choice.
Substituting out the change in profits as in (3.6) yields
πeπˆe = −(π + sXπX) · p − er
p − u · tˆ . (3.10)
3.3 Cost of public funds
The deadweight loss of the corporate tax reflects the fact that the income equivalent
welfare loss imposed on the private sector exceeds the extra tax revenue that is raised
by government. To quantify the difference, it is convenient to define the tax base B
and rewrite tax revenue, net of the demand subsidy, as
z = t · B − ν · p · c, B ≡ (p − er)K. (3.11)
Corporate tax revenue is T = t · B and changes by dT = (1 − t)B[tˆ + t1−t Bˆ].
The tax base responds to both firm size and location choice. If investment shrinks
on the extensive margin, it leaves the margin p − er constant but erodes the tax
base by lowering investment K . Smaller firm size, however, not only reduces K, but
also comes with a countervailing effect on the tax base since reduced output boosts
prices, and thereby inflates the margin p − er . Making use of (3.5) and (3.9), the tax
base adjusts by Bˆ = (1 − p
p−er
1
ε
)kˆ + ηπˆX . By earlier definitions, tax liability and net
profits of an export firm in terms of the average tax rate are t (p − er)kX = taπ∗X and
(1 − t)(p − u)kX = πX = (1 − ta)π∗X . Dividing these relations implies t1−t p−erp−u =
ta
1−ta . Profits in (3.7) thus change by
t
1−t πˆX = − ta1−ta tˆ . Substituting this together with
kˆ = −εtˆm = −ε 1−e1−et tˆ yields, upon using (3.1),
t
1 − t · Bˆ = −
[
tm
1 − tm με+
ta
1 − ta η
]
· tˆ , μ ≡ 1 − tm
1 − t
(
1− p
p − er
1
ε
)
≥ 0. (3.12)
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The parameter μ controls the elasticity of the tax base with respect to intensive invest-
ment. With full expensing, e = 1, the user cost is equal to interest. Markup pricing
yields p/(p − r) = 1/(1 − α) = ε, giving μ = 0. If there are no investment deduc-
tions, e = 0 and tm = t , μ = α so that tax base erosion due to reduced business growth
is largest.
The change in corporate tax revenue noted after (3.11) thus becomes
dT = (1 − t)B
[
1 − tm
1 − tm · με −
ta
1 − ta · η
]
· tˆ . (3.13)
The first term in the square bracket is simply the direct revenue effect from raising
the tax rate. The second term relating to ε captures the distorting effect of the tax rate
on intensive investment (or firm size) and on the producer price, which both affect
the tax base. The third term relating to η shows how a high statutory tax rate erodes
the tax base by reducing investment on the extensive margin, reflecting more outward
FDI.
To characterize the deadweight loss, one starts by calculating the welfare change
in (2.2), dU = πeπˆe + dz − (1 − ν)c dp. The last term reflects the loss of consumer
surplus when the price marginally increases. To evaluate this formula, we first show
how net profits and tax base B are related,
π + sXπX = (1 − t)(p − u)K = (1 − t)B p − u
p − er . (3.14)
In consequence, the impact on total profits in (3.10) is πeπˆe = −(1 − t)B · tˆ . Fur-
ther, (3.11) implies a change in transfers to households equal to dz = dT − ν · d(pc).
Substituting these results and using c = k, and pˆ = −(1 − α)kˆ from (2.4) together
with kˆ = −εtˆm, the welfare differential becomes
dU = −(1 − t)Btˆ + dT − (1 − v − α) · pk · εtˆm. (3.15)
Substituting (3.13) and (3.4), the impact on welfare is
dU
(1 − t)B = −
[
tm
1 − tm με+
ta
1 − ta η+ε
]
tˆ ,  ≡ 1 − v − α
(1 − t)B ·
(1 − e)pk
1 − et . (3.16)
The last term  in the bracket reflects the effect of markup pricing on consumer
surplus. In reducing intensive investment, the tax reduces sales and thereby leads to
higher prices, which cuts into consumer surplus. This could be offset with an appro-
priate demand subsidy, which would ensure (1 − ν)p = u and thereby equate con-
sumer price to marginal cost. Since markup pricing results in αp = u, the required
subsidy would be 1 − ν = α. If the demand subsidy were optimally chosen in the
initial equilibrium, the pricing distortion is eliminated ( = 0). When the tax mar-
ginally increases the user cost and the producer price, the welfare impact of the price
increase is zero to the first order. Of course, the welfare loss also disappears with
1 = e since in this case the tax does not distort intensive investment, leaving user
cost and producer price unaffected. The first two terms in the square bracket relate to
the twofold investment distortion. The distortion on the intensive margin depends on
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the EMTR and the intensive investment elasticity ε. The distortion on the extensive
margin depends on the EATR and the extensive elasticity η.
We can now measure the tax distortion in terms of the marginal deadweight loss
per additional Euro of corporate tax revenue. Using (3.13) and (3.16),
MDWL ≡ −dU
dT
=
tm
1−tm · με + ta1−ta · η +  · ε
1 − tm1−tm · με − ta1−ta · η
. (3.17)
The marginal cost of public funds is one plus the marginal deadweight loss,
MCPF = 1 +  · ε
1 − tm1−tm · με − ta1−ta · η
. (3.18)
Except for the extra term  referring to the markup pricing distortion, this formula
is entirely parallel to the analysis of intensive and extensive labor supply distortions.
It compares, for example, with MCPF formula of Kleven and Kreiner (2006) if one
reduces the household sector to only one income group. Their work is based on an
earlier influential contribution by Saez (2002), see also Immervoll et al. (2007) and
Dahlby (2008) for related work.
To evaluate the formula more fully, it is useful to discuss two special cases. Con-
sider first the case where fixed costs of FDI are prohibitive which prevents any multi-
national investment at all. Therefore, the share of successful exporters sX is fixed (and
sI = sF = 0 in (2.14)) which eliminates the extensive margin of investment, η = 0.
One is exclusively left with the standard distortion on the intensive margin where
corporate taxation reduces the level of investment by domestic firms,
MCPF = 1 + ε
1 − tm1−tm · με
. (3.19)
The cash-flow tax (e = 1) would be entirely neutral in this case, reducing tm and 
to zero. The tax is neutral not only with respect to intensive investment, but thereby
also avoids the loss in consumer surplus from the pricing distortion.11 The marginal
cost of public funds would be one as with a lump-sum tax.
A second useful case to consider is an increase in the cash-flow tax with imme-
diate expensing (e = 1). The EMTR is kept to zero since the tax entirely avoids the
intensive distortion. The MCPF then reflects the distortion on the extensive margin
only,
MCPF = 1
1 − ta1−ta · η
. (3.20)
The cash-flow tax is thus not neutral in an economy with multinational investment. It
raises revenue from the taxation of inframarginal profits which results in a substantial
EATR and thereby distorts location choice. The magnitude of the distortion and the
cost of public funds associated with the corporate tax depend on the EATR and the
11The pricing distortion  could be eliminated in any case with a demand subsidy v = 1 − α.
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extensive elasticity η. This elasticity is defined in (3.9) and measures by how much
aggregate investment K declines as more firms relocate investment and production
from home to the foreign country in response to an increasing net of tax profit differ-
ential πI − πX between export and FDI sales.
4 Conclusions
To the best of our knowledge, the public finance literature has not provided so far a
consistent characterization of the intensive and extensive investment distortions as-
sociated with the corporate tax, or other taxes at the personal level which affect firm
values and capital accumulation within firms. This gap is all the more serious since
the policy oriented discussion has recently assigned a very prominent role to the im-
portance of EATRs (see, for example, GCEA 2006, or European Commission 2001).
The policy report by the GCEA does not even present any detailed calculations of the
proposed reform on EMTRs, but emphasizes much the reduction of EATRs. A first
insight from the theoretical analysis is that, strictly speaking, the EATR is not an in-
dependent but an endogenous tax measure that depends on the statutory tax rate as
well as on the EMTR. The effective marginal rate affects firm growth and changes
the firm’s gross of tax value and the present value of tax payments. It thereby enters
the EATR which is the ratio of these two values.
Traditional thinking is probably still much dominated by the excess burden asso-
ciated with intensive investment. The surveys of the empirical literature by Devereux
(2007) and De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) find that multinational investment re-
sponds sensitively to measures of statutory and average tax rates, and is more elastic
than standard estimates of investment with respect to the user cost of capital suggest.
The analyses of Buettner and Ruf (2007) and Buettner and Wamser (2006) show that
corporate taxes affect both the scale and location of multinational investment. Given
the elastic investment response on the extensive margin, the marginal cost of pub-
lic funds due to the corporate tax must be revised up quite substantially since the
tax shrinks aggregate investment on two margins: First, all domestically active firms
invest less. Second, some firms no longer build new plants at home for export pro-
duction but rather build them abroad to be closer to foreign customers. The welfare
cost of the corporate tax is, therefore, importantly related to the size of the EATR and
the extensive elasticity. This elasticity determines how many plants are built abroad
rather than at home in response to a tax induced increase in differential net of tax
profits. The analysis showed how the marginal cost of corporate taxation depends on
the magnitude of effective average and marginal tax rates and appropriately defined
behavioral elasticities of intensive and extensive investment response.
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